The arbitrability of competition law disputes remains one of the most complex and controversial issues in international arbitration, as such disputes lie at the intersection of party autonomy, mandatory rules, and public policy considerations. Traditionally, the mandatory and public nature of competition law, together with its role in safeguarding market integrity, led many legal systems to exclude these disputes from arbitration. Public policy thus functioned as a preliminary jurisdictional barrier to arbitral authority.

However, developments in judicial practice and arbitral doctrine have prompted a reassessment of this traditional view and the emergence of a more flexible approach to arbitrability. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative methodology, this article examines the concept of arbitrability and its relationship with public policy, with particular emphasis on the “second-look review” doctrine as a modern mechanism for reconciling arbitration with competition law enforcement.

Under this doctrine, competition law disputes are considered arbitrable, provided that courts retain the power to conduct effective judicial review at the stages of recognition, enforcement, or annulment of arbitral awards. Accordingly, public policy is transformed from a prior obstacle to arbitral jurisdiction into a subsequent control mechanism designed to ensure compliance with mandatory competition and antitrust rules.

The findings indicate that a limited yet strategic form of judicial review is necessary in competition law disputes to safeguard mandatory rules and protect economic public policy. At the same time, such review must be carefully structured so as not to undermine the finality of arbitral awards or the efficiency of the arbitral process. Consequently, it is recommended that national arbitration regimes maintain the principle of minimal judicial intervention while expressly providing for judicial control in cases involving manifest violations of mandatory competition law provisions