In complex judicial proceedings, such as cases involving bodily harm arising from medical negligence or malpractice, where the adjudicator (judge) lacks the requisite technical expertise in the matter at hand, the expert opinion transcends its role as a mere auxiliary tool and effectively becomes the primary foundation (de facto foundation) of the ensuing verdict .The fundamental challenge arises precisely at the point where this very foundation suffers from structural instability. Current judicial practice indicates that the multiplicity of competent bodies authorized to issue expert opinions—and the lack of procedural uniformity among these institutions—has led to conflicting, and at times contradictory, findings in similar cases.The present study seeks to answer the question: What is the governing criterion for referring medical malpractice cases for expert opinions from the various competent bodies—specifically, the Legal Medicine Organization, the Medical Council, official court-appointed experts, or the Special Council for Dispute Resolution in Medical Affairs?Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and gathering data through both doctrinal (library) research and empirical (field) investigation—specifically, by examining approximately 1,000 medical malpractice case files and interviewing 7 judges who adjudicate such cases—the study concludes that there is currently no clear, transparent, and binding legal standard governing the referral of cases to these distinct bodies. Consequently, the determination is largely relegated to the subjective discretion of the presiding judge.This practice directly undermines the fundamental principle of a fair trial (or Due Process). When the outcome of the litigation is determined not by a uniform technical standard, but rather becomes contingent upon which expert body the case was referred to, the predictability of judgments and public confidence in the justice system are severely compromised.