The practice of torture is explicitly prohibited by numerous domestic and international laws. In the legal system of Iran, this prohibition is enshrined in Article 38 of the Constitution, with its legal sanction specified in Article 578 of the Islamic Penal Code. However, there remains a debate as to whether this prohibition is absolute or if its authorization can be justified under specific circumstances. Islamic jurists generally regard the prohibition of torture as absolute, viewing it as an act fundamentally contrary to inherent human dignity. Conversely, a few opinions—deviating from the jurisprudential consensus—while acknowledging the general prohibition, argue for its permissibility under Secondary Titles and in light of critical or crisis situations. The primary objective of this research is to evaluate the positions of rules that conflict with the "prohibition of torture" rule. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and relying on library-based resources, this study seeks to prove the non-derogable (absolute) nature of the prohibition of torture within the framework of jurisprudential rules. Furthermore, it analyzes and critiques the arguments favoring limited authorization of torture. The findings conclude that, according to Islamic Law, any form of harassment or mistreatment of individuals, including torture, is prohibited. Consequently, authorizing torture even in a limited capacity is undeniably forbidden; therefore, all instances of torture are rejected, and any confession obtained through such means is legally void and inadmissible.