The Quarterly Journal of Judicial Law Views

The Quarterly Journal of Judicial Law Views

Economic efficiency and government intervention in the contracts

Author
hassan lotfi
Abstract
At first, the economic efficiency has been brought up in economics and then developed as a superior normative purpose and value in another areas such as law. Accordingly, many areas including the free market, the contracts and their related laws have been formed with regard to this normative purpose and its implications and are going to obtain the most interests and achievements, while they spend the least level of resources. emphasizing the assumptions such as existence of full competition in the market and full information and rationality of the parties, the classic economists believe that market performs its role without government intervention and achieves economic efficiency. But, incorrectness of classic economics assumptions and failure of the free market, the contracts and the law governing them, proved failure. Therefore, with regard to importance of the economic efficiency, it must obtained by another way. It is exactly the government intervention in the contracts throgh some rules of the nature of public law; a method which is subject of criticism. Of course, its negative effects are reduciable and therefore economic efficiency in the contracts can be achieved throgh the government intervention. In this article, different viewpoints about the issue will be discussed.
Keywords
Keywords: Economic efficiency
government intervention
contracts
public law
market economy
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